Mike's musings

The death penalty - and Baby P

I've been meaning to blog on this topic for a while now, and I've finally decided to jump on it and do so. In fact, I've been meaning to blog about it from before the Baby P story broke, but I think it's even more important now.

As you may have noticed, here in the UK, there has been enormous outcry at the death of a 3 year old baby known as "Baby P" at the hands of his parents, from terrible injuries. And that outcry has come, unsurprisingly, from people with small children: people like us. That's understandable, and no cause for alarm: there should be an outcry, as this should not have happened. However, it goes beyond that. There are calls for the death penalty for those responsible: or at least for the death penalty to be available to people who commit such crimes. A number of my friends on Facebook have signed up to groups advocating this, and similar. And I can see why. But I believe this to be fundamentally wrong: I passionately believe that we should not have the death penalty.

My reasons are many, and I'm going to try to lay them out here. Interestingly, I think, few of them are based on faith or theology. I realise that my general approach to ethical issues is a Christian one, but I don't think that this is a question that needs Christianity - or other faith - to be invoked in order to decide it. Why, then, should we not have the death penalty?

1. The very top reason is that it brutalises. The ability to call for the death penalty allows us to dip deep into the animal part of us and ignore the rational, the thinking, the loving. And I would ask the question: "do you want your children to grow up in a society where violence is punished with violence?"
2. It's not a deterrent, in many cases. Crimes that are, in other countries, punishable by the death penalty are not those which are avoided by thinking "oh, I might get the death penalty for this: I won't do it, then"
3. It's unjust. It is the economically, socially, academically and intellectually disadvantaged who are by far the most likely to receive the death penalty
4. It's unjust (2). In criminal organisations, it is those on the ground, the lowest in the chain, who are most likely to receive the death penalty: they're more likely to get caught, they're less likely to get off (see above), and they're more likely to have committed the actual crime themselves, rather than having ordered it
5. It's truly a one-way ticket. Mistakes are made: history is littered with them. People who have been found guilty, received the death penalty, and have then been found not to have committed the crime. A confession is no guarantee, either: confessions can be forced, and some people confess because they want to die, even if they haven't committed the crime
6. It's a betrayal. I believe that people have fought - and died - to leave us with a society where we have the opportunity to be decent, honest and just. The death penalty is none of those, and by lowering ourselves to the level of those who commit the crimes that are believed to merit it, we betray those people who have come before us.

I'm not even going to start on Christian arguments: I really don't think they're needed. Comments are _especially_ welcome.

Labels: children, death, ethics, love

Synchroblog - Human rights (and Christian responsibilities)

Ramblings of a proto-ethicist

As a liberal - and I live in a country where the moniker is not an insult, at least not yet - I am drawn to the discourse of human rights. There is a strong calling to recognising the rights of the inidividual, particularly as against the State, and to a consequentialist ethics which, at root, exists to ensure - or to try to ensure - the best outcome for the most people.

An example: there are rights around whether I should be allowed to exist in a smoke-free environment. I believe that I have a right to health. You argue that you have a right to smoke if you wish. The arbitration tends to be - and has been, in the UK, at least - that the benefits to society as a whole (in terms of healthcare costs for smokers, for instance) outweigh the rights of smokers to injure those around them. This is a good argument, but there are problems with it (not least issues of how you tax smokers, and why you allow tobacco to be sold in the first place). For me as a Christian, however, I am beginning to question how I feel about the consequentialist argument.

The classic alternative to the consequentialist argument ("do the best for the greatest number of people") is the de-ontological argument ("do what is right" - sometimes over-simplified to "the end justifies the means"). This is an argument from the Law. And, for Christians, it is with a capital "L", typically. There are a number of problems with this: not least the suffering of individuals who are often trampled underfoot, and the problems with being certain that you know _what_ is right (and what "the Law" really commands). But one way to balance these issues is to remember that with rights come responsibilities: they are always balanced the one against each other. For some, this can move us into an approach labelled "virtue ethics", but I'm not yet sure that I want to move down this line.

I don't have answers this month (do I ever?), but I think that if we remember that rights _always_ entail responsibilities, we are at least part of the way there.

Synchroblog

Today's post is a "synchroblog" on the subject of "human rights". If you've liked what you read here, or, more particularly, if you didn't, and you'd like to read some other opinions, please visit one of the other participating blogs:

• Sonja Andrews on Human Wrongs
• Adam Gonnerman on Guantanamo Bay in the eyes of God
• Julie Clawson on Human rights and Christian comfort
• Steve Hayes on Human rights and Christian faith
• Sally Coleman on "If"
• Adam Gonerman on "My Charade is the event of the season"
• Janice Fowler on "Voice Overs Needed" (or "Wake up - Speak Up")
• Mike Bursell on Human rights (and Christian responsibilities)

Labels: ethics, synchroblog